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Introduction 
Science is a collective enterprise – it is not simply the aggregated efforts of 
individuals.  In fact, some writers (e.g. [1]) go so far as to claim that the social 
processes special to science are the only thing that distinguishes it from other 
activities.  In any case the social processes are critical to the success and character of 
what we know of as science.  Here I exhibit a simulation that explores some of these. 
Traditionally there is the „building-block‟ picture of science [2] where knowledge is 
slowly built up, brick by brick, as a result of reliable contributions to knowledge – 
each contribution standing upon its predecessors.  Here, as long as each contribution 
is checked as completely reliable, the process can continue until an indefinitely high 
edifice of interdependent knowledge has been constructed.  However other pictures 
have been proposed.  Kuhn in [3] suggested that often science progresses not 
gradually but in revolutions, where past structures are torn down and completely new 
ones built.   
Despite the importance of the social processes in science to society, they are 
relatively little studied.  The philosophy of science has debated, at some length, the 
epistemological aspects of science – how knowledge is created and checked „at the 
coal face of the individual‟.  Social processes have been introduced mainly by critics 
of science – to point out that because science progresses through social processes it is  
„only‟ a social construction, and thus has no special status or unique reliability. 
Here I take a neutral view, that is it is likely that there are many different social 
processes occurring in different parts of science and at different times, and that these 
processes will impact upon the nature, quality and quantity of the knowledge that is 
produced.  It seems clear to me that sometimes the social processes act to increase 
the reliability of knowledge (such as when there is a tradition of independently 
reproducing experiments) but sometimes does the opposite (when a closed clique act 
to perpetuate itself by reducing opportunity for criticism). Simulation can perform a 
valuable role here by providing and refining possible linkages between the kinds of 
social processes and its results in terms of knowledge.  Earlier simulations of this sort 
include Gilbert in [4].  The simulation described herein aims to progress this work 
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with a more structural and descriptive approach, that relates what is done by 
individuals and journals and what collectively results in terms of the overall process. 
The Simulation 
The General Structure 
The simulation involves a fixed number of agents (representing individual or closely 
collaborating teams of scientists) a journal (only one in the present simulation) which 
includes the set of formal sentences representing the knowledge that is discovered 
and published.  Each agent has a private store of knowledge which may or may not 
be public (i.e. an axiom or published) – this store is their working knowledge.  To 
use a public item of knowledge this must be added to their private store before they 
can use it to produce new items.  They submit some of this to the journal which 
selects (according to some criteria) a subset which is then published and becomes 
available to others.   The whole set-up is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Agent-1 
Agent-2 
The Journal 
The Axioms 
MP 
MP 
 
Figure 1. An illustration of the set-up with two agents (circles are items of knowledge, 
rectangles are agents) 
The Environment and Task 
Science continually progresses into the unknown.  In science sometimes the end 
points are known – for example, when it is known that a certain disease is passed on 
genetically, then the genes that are responsible may be sought.  Often, however, 
scientific discoveries are a surprise to their discoverers.  Thus it is often the case that 
scientists do not know exactly what it is they are searching for.  This is in contrast to 
engineering where it is usual to know the problem for which an answer is sought. 
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This poses a problem for a would-be simulator of the social and cognitive processes 
that contribute to science – how can one simulate creative discovery of the unknown? 
The answer I have chosen is to use a formal system (logic) as the representation of 
knowledge, so that the agents work on the logical structures to produce new 
structures (theorems in the logical sense), but where it is impossible to know in 
advance how useful these will be. This decision has distinct consequences both in 
terms of the possibilities and limitations of the model and in terms of the 
assumptions on which it relies.  These will be discussed later.  This can be seen as 
following [5]. 
Thus the universe of knowledge that the agents will explore in this simulation is the 
set of inferable formal sentences derivable from a given set of initial axioms.  For 
ease of implementation I have restricted my self to logics formalisable as Hilbert 
Systems (that is, ones with a set of axioms and a single rule of inference, Modus 
Ponens, which is recursively applied, see an introduction to logic, e.g. [6]).  The 
agents can produce new sentences by applying existing sentences to other sentences 
using Modus Ponens (MP).  The form of this is if you know A  and you know 
BA then you can also conclude B  (written BBAA |, ).  An example of this 
is: when A  is )()(( aaaa  and B  is )( aa : from )()(( aaaa  
and bbaa ))((  we can infer )( aa .  This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
bbaa ))((  
)()(( aaaa
 
BA  (Major Premise) 
A (Minor Premise) 
)( aa
 
B (Inference) 
 
Figure 2. An illustration of the working of MP 
The agents thus have the task of discovering new formal sentences.  The advantages 
of this structure are that: (1) future developments from any item of knowledge are 
not known in advance; (2) knowledge is not only useful as an end in itself but can be 
used as a tool to act upon other knowledge to produce new knowledge (as the major 
premise in MP, the A in Figure 2); (3) the programmer of the simulation does not 
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necessarily know how one gets to any given theorem of the system, which reduces 
the temptation to bias the simulation to get specific results; (4) the task is suitably 
hard, as the development of automatic theorem-provers shows. 
In order to set up the field of knowledge that the agents will collectively explore the 
simulator needs to list the symbols being used and list the axioms of the relevant 
logic.  Optionally the simulator can also list a number of known theorems that are 
considered important by logicians and give them a value, though how one derives 
these is not needed to be specified (this is for the agents to find out).  These „target 
theorems‟ are unknown to the agents until they discover them.  They represent (in the 
loosest possible way) useful technologies that may come out of science.  Counting 
how many of these have been discovered (and the total value of their „worth‟) is an 
indication of the effectiveness of the collective discover effort, and can be a better 
measure that simply counting how many new sentences have been discovered since it 
is easy to develop trivial elaborations of already known sentences. 
The Agents 
In this simulation the agents have a very simple-minded approach to the production 
of new knowledge: agents select two items in its own store of knowledge and apply 
the MP rule to it, which may or may not result in a new item of knowledge which is 
added to their store.  Each agent has two private stores of knowledge: firstly, a store 
of formal sentences that are candidates as the minor premises for the MP rule and 
secondly, store composed of candidates for the major premises.  The former roughly 
corresponds to the primary knowledge of a scientist and the second as the set of 
techniques of the agent since it determines which transformations can be applied to 
which items and what can be produced.   
Each time period the agent does the following: 
1. Decide what new items of knowledge (both major and minor) to add to its 
private store from the published set, also which to drop. 
2. Decide which major premise and what set of minor premises it will try with 
the MP rule and add any results to its (minor) store. 
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3. Decide which of its private knowledge (that is not already public) it will 
submit to the journal. 
There are obviously many different ways of making these decisions.  Each of these 
ways will have a (varying) impact upon the development of the collective 
knowledge.  In addition to the above, gradual, update policy if the agent fails to 
discover any new sentences during a given number of consecutive time periods it 
may „panic‟ and completely replace one of its stores with a new set of sentences. 
Key parameters and setting of the agent are as follows.  For each of its private 
knowledge stores (minor and major) the update policy includes the following: its 
size; the rate at which it adds or drops knowledge from this store; how it does either 
the addition; the dropping; or the panic replacement (at random/probabilistically the 
best/the best judge either on raw past fertility or past fertility with a bias towards 
simplicity); whether it panics and how long it endures lack of success before 
panicking; which to try (the best/probabilistically the best/untried/random); and how 
it judges what it knows (personal fertility/lack of failure to produce new knowledge). 
Also its submission policy: whether it submits all novel (i.e. unpublished) sentences 
to the journal or only the simplest/best ones. 
The Journal 
The journal (the Journal of Artificial Sentences and Successful Syllogisms) is the 
gatekeeper to the repository of public knowledge.  The key aspect of the journal is 
the criteria it uses for assessing the items submitted to it, so as to decided what (if 
any) it will publish.  This occurs in three basic stages: the short-listing of those that 
met basic criteria; the evaluation of those short listed; and their ranking.  The journal 
then published a selection of the top n in the ranking (if there were more than n short 
listed), otherwise all of them.  This final selection could be the best (from the top); 
probabilistically on the weighted score (the higher the score the more likely it is to be 
selected); randomly or simply all of them.  The evaluation of the submissions was 
done as a weighted sum of scores for a number of aspects: the number of variables in 
the sentence, its brevity, the extent to which it shortens sentences when used in MP, 
and the past success of the author.  The weights and selection policies can be set by 
the programmer. 
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Methods of evaluation 
Key to many of the decisions made by the agents or the journal is the evaluation of 
the existing knowledge.  Ultimately this can be considered as a guess at the future 
usefulness of that knowledge, in terms of either: its productivity in producing new 
knowledge; reaching the hidden „target theorems‟; or in getting published.  This may 
be done in a number of ways.  One way is by looking at the historical record of how 
productive the sentence has been in the past in resulting in new published knowledge 
(this can be done in a recursive way to value sentences that have produced 
productive sentences etc.).  Another way is to look at the most published agents and 
see what knowledge they have used (in published work).  Other ways include 
considering features of the sentences themselves, for example measures of their 
simplicity (how many variables they have, how long they are, to what extent the 
sentence results in a shortening of sentences when applied using MP, etc.) 
Preliminary Results 
At the time of writing only preliminary results are available, which explore only a 
very small proportion of the possibilities inherent in this model.  By the time the full 
paper is due I expect to have a better feel for the nature of some of the results and the 
deeper limitations of the model structure.  However a summary of the indications so 
far obtained follows. 
Many of the settings do affect the outcomes to a significant degree.  However many 
which increase the short-term success (measured in a number of different ways) of 
the scientific progress also have the effect of reducing the longer-term maintenance 
of new results.  Thus, for example, adding new sentences at random to an agent‟s 
private knowledge (i.e. regardless of the agent‟s evaluation of sentences) decreased 
the short-term level of discovery markedly, but then that level of discovery lasted a 
longer time.  In contrast where agents follow other agents closely (preferentially 
adding sentences used successfully by others) results followed much more quickly to 
begin with but then petered out to zero after 40-60 time periods (only then deviating 
from zero when an agent panicked and hit lucky with its new set of knowledge).  
Such a result would indicate that a process of fairly frequent, but collective 
revolution was one of the most efficient collective modes of discovery. 
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In general most of the targeted sentences were either discovered very soon, or never.  
This suggests that “deep” sentences (those difficult to reach in this collective but 
individually stupid manner) require guidance from a deeper knowledge of the 
individual logics concerned, and is not so amenable to a generic approach (collective 
or otherwise).  
Discussion 
The Possibility of Limited Validation 
Following [4] it may be possible to compare the structure of the published 
knowledge that results in this simulation (i.e. which authors/items are derived from 
which previous items by which authors) might be compared with the structure found 
in citation indexes such ISI using a number of measures, statistics or structural 
comparisons.  Unfortunately negotiations with ISI indicate that they are only 
prepared to part with the structural information of their databases (suitably 
anonymised) for rather large quantities of money (i.e. around $30000).  If anyone 
knows of an alternative source, please contact the author. 
Limitation and Extensions 
Clearly many of the limitations in this simulation are arbitrary:  Thus I list a few 
possible extensions as examples: 
 decision methods of arbitrary complexity can be implemented in agents 
(indeed these methods could themselves be evolved by GP);  
 there could be many journals so that the prestige of a journal; its impacts and 
the quality of its submissions could be allowed to develop with the simulation;   
 instead of inferring new knowledge the agents could hypothesise and test 
candidate sentences performing tests on the logical semantics (e.g. a row of the 
truth tables in classical logic); 
 a peer review system could be implemented whereby reviewers are selected 
depending on their past publishing success and impact; they could use their 
own experience of what is useful as their criteria for judging entries and their 
own tests; and items could be selected resulting on the votes of reviewers; 
 informal social networks could be introduce to pass knowledge from agent to 
agent other than via official journals; 
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 agents should be allowed to reproduce in terms of the students they teach and 
retire after a suitable time (or if they are spectacularly unsuccessful). 
More fundamentally the present structure of the simulation assumes that there is 
some independent „correct‟ knowledge to be discovered and that it is checkable.  
This could be corrected by providing some database of atomic facts (e.g. the linkage 
structure of part of the web) and then hypotheses about these could be attempted to 
be induced (as in inductive data-mining techniques).  The journal (or journals) would 
not be able to 100% check the veracity of any knowledge but have to rely on some 
fallible process to come to a judgement upon the knowledge.  However, a 
disadvantage of such an approach is that it would lack the tight inter-dependency of 
knowledge that seems to be such a characteristic of some sciences1. 
Relationship with Distributed Theorem Proving (DTP) 
The simulation is a forward-chaining theorem prover, and can be seen as an answer 
to [7] since it could be truly distributed.  However it is a very inefficient one – it is 
deliberately generic in that it has not been „tuned‟ for performance (by using deep 
properties of the particular logic being investigated), since this is not its goal.  
Despite this, lessons learned in this simulation do have potential in terms of 
informing the design of distributed theorem provers and vice versa from what is 
discovered about efficient DTP to this simulation (and potentially science itself2). 
OTTER [8], a particular and quite successful theorem prover is quite close to the 
how a single agent works in the above simulation.  It has a list of candidate minor 
and major premises and works on these to extend the set of known sentences until it 
reaches the target theorems.  It allows for a large range of techniques in re-writing 
formulas, guiding search and applying rules that are not touched upon here. 
Conclusion 
I hope to have shown how it is possible to capture some aspects of the social 
processes that contribute to the construction of science.  Such modelling has the 
potential to intermediate between observations concerning how science works and 
                                                 
1 Of course it may be that this is more appropriate for the social sciences. 
2 One can but dream! 
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areas of distributed knowledge discovery in computer science, e.g. automated 
theorem proving. It could help sort out the roles of the different processes in science 
confirming or disconfirming philosophical speculations (such as [9]). 
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